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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STArfE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff and Respondent
Case No.
9265

vs.
JOSEPH ERSOL BERCHTOLD

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOSEPH ERSOL BERCHTOLD

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 15th, 1959, one Joseph E. Berchtold and his
friend of long standing, Joseph Van Forrest, both of Brigham
City, Utah, left Brigham City in the late afternoon for Cache
Valley, arriving in Logan at approximately 7 o'clock p.m.,
(Tr. 412). From Logan they drove around for a while and
then drove north in Berchtold's 1959 Chevrolet automobile
to Smithfield and then west to Newton where Mr. Forrest
had a girl friend by the name of Nora Jean Christensen
.3
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(Tr. 413). Mr. Forrest went into her home on arrival and
brought her out to the car where she was introduced for the
first time to the defendant Berchtold and from there they
started east toward Smithfield to pick up a blind date (Tr. 414)
for the defendant. As they drove east (Tr. 413) the defendant was driving, the Christensen girl in the center with Mr.
Forrest on the right. All were in the front seat. As they went
in the direction of Smithfield there is a bridge over the Bear
River that must be crossed. It is approximately seven miles
east of Newton with the road fairly straight (Tr. 413). As
the car proceeded east and was close to the point where the
bridge was built across the river (Tr. 414):
... Van and Nora Jean was up in the light of the
radio looking at his Thiokol badge. They had it in
their hand and the light of the radio was the only light
in the car other than the dashboard. But they were
looking at it and seeing his picture on it, and it wasNora Jean stated to me that if we didn't hurry that
this-I can't remember her name for sure. I think said
Rosie or something, would be in bed if we didn't get
over there quite fast, and I guess she maybe got kind
of bored that we weren't in any hurry. I never felt any
hurry in my mind. I was just enjoying the evening and
she-

Q. What did you do then at that time?
A. I picked up my speed probably up to forty-five
or fifty-five at the most.
Q. And what did you reach at that time by way of
change of route or anything?
A. We came to the first corner of the bridge and
then down over it to the bridge.

Q. Came down over the bridge?
1
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A. Yeah.
Q. Did you know how fast you were going when
you came down over the bridge?

A. No, I don't.
Q. You never looked at the speedometer at that
time?

A. No.
Q. What did you do as you came down across the
bridge, if you know?

A. Well, as I came down to the bridge, as I hit the
bridge I brightened my lights to see which way the
road went, out of instinct, and I probably let my foot
off the gas out of instinct. As I came to the corner I
was a little in doubt as to which way the road went.
Q. Had you been over the road earlier that evening,
the same road ?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was it dark when you came over it?

A. Yes.
Q. Was it dark when you went back?

A. Yes.
Q. Had you ever been over that road before?
A. No.

Q. Those were the only two times in your life; ts
that correct?

A. Yes, I've been there since.
Q. And then what happened?

A. As I came to the corner I was a little in doubt,
like I say.

5
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Q. A little in doubt about what?
A. Which way the road went, other than if-I figured that we were going back straight east when we
came to the corner. I didn't know for sure, and so I
kind of had it in my mind that the road went on
straight, but when I brightened my lights I could see
there was a corner.

Q. Go ahead then.
A. As I got to the corner I could see that the road
went left, and as I turned I was in the gravel and I
could feel my back end going a little sideways on the
back end, and I could hear the gravel hitting the
back of the car, as the tire hits it up into the splash pan,
I could hear that. And I could, you know, I could feel
myself going in a skid and I possibly-

Q. WTas it a violent skid?
A. No, it wasn't really too bad then.

Q. Well, was that the first feeling of any give of
your car up to that point?
A. Yes.

Q. And you say you heard the gravel at that time?
A. Yes.

Q. Then what took place?
A. Well, I turned the wheels, started trying to fight
-well, I wasn't really too worried, but I tried to kind
of fight it and I was turning the wheel. And then all
of a sudden it seemed like I possibly hit my brakes or
something and it seemed like I locked it sideways off
the road. I could see my lights turn around, and then
all of a sudden they flipped in the air. Then I can't
ren1ember anything until after I stopped.

Q. Was there any screaming or yelling or warning?
6
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A. No, there wasn't. Nobody said anything. I think
they still were down in the radio lights looking at the
badge.

Q. Did you feel like at any time up to the point
where youMR. CALDERWOOD: I object to the form of
the question.
MR. MANN: He's the only one that can state it.
MR. CALDERWOOD: I object to what he feels.

Q. -that your car was under control?
MR. CALDERWOOD: Oh, I object to that.
THE COURT: He may answer that.
A. Would you please repeat it?

Q. Did you feel like your car was entirely under
control up to the time that you hit the gravel?
A. Definitely.

Q. Did you feel that you were going at an excessive
rate of speed up to the time you hit the gravel?

A. No.
This statement of facts leading up to the accident made
at the time of trial should be compared with the written
statement given to Officer Bair, defendant's Exhibit No. 26,
from a hospital bed the following morning. Basically the
only difference was the speed where on the T r. page 415 line
10, it states:
I picked up my speed probably up to forty-five
of fifty-five at the most."
C( • • •

The driving speed claimed (Tr. 414-7) prior to any
acceleration was 40-45. However, (Tr. 422-30) the defendant
7
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was asked about the speed stated in Exhibit No. 26, which is as
follows:
C(Q. Now one question I wanted to ask you. I note
that in here, C(It looked straight, but as I came down
at approximately sixty-five miles an hour." Did you
know how fast you were coming down to this bridge
as a fact? Did you check your speedometer?
A. No.

Q. Why did you put that you came down approximately sixty-five miles an hour?
A. I don't ... I never did have any idea in speed
in my mind. I don't remember any time stating any
speed other than approximately. I don't know why I
put it approximately sixty-five. Maybe it's just because
everybody up there, uyou were going fast or something, wasn't you?" or something like that.

Q. Had people been telling you that you must have
been speeding?

.A. Yes."
Mr. Bair claimed however (Tr. 51) that the defendant
said he was going about 70 over the bridge. The defendant
(Tr. 424-7) stated:

C(Q. Now, you heard Officer Bair say that you told
him that you were driving seventy miles an hour when
he first talked to you. Do you remember any conversation with Mr. Bair where you told him you were
driving seventy miles an hour?
A. No. I says I don't think I could have possibly
been going more than seventy miles an hour. I never
stated the speed of seventy miles an hour.

Q. What made you say, '] don't think I could
possibly have been going at a speed more than seventy
.:;,)
t)
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miles an hour" ? Had there been other conversations
about speed at that time?
A. Well, he'd asked me how fast I was going, and
I says I didn't know, and he says, "Well, you must
have"-\vell, no, he didn't say anything. I got the
implication that maybe he was meaning I was going
quite fast, and I just said, "Well, I don't think I could
have been possibly going more than seventy miles an
hour."
It should also be compared with Officer Bair's testimony
of what the defendant said immediately after the accident at
the scene about speed, the curve and loose gravel (Tr. 52,
lines 10-20).
Some beer had been purchased at Brigham City in unopened bottles. After the girl got in the car at Newton a
bottle was opened up and handed to the defendant (Tr. 42518) and he stuck it between his legs. When asked by the officer
if he would submit to a blood test (Tr. 25) he readily agreed.
Officer Bair testified when asked by the District Attorney
(Tr. 50-11) that the tests showed the defendant was not
intoxicated. No test was introduced by the State so we must
conclude it had no evidentiary value.
The bridge and the road, before and after, must be
described. The road leading east from Newton is a standard
width, oiled surface country road, approximately 22 to 23 feet
wide and fairly straight until you come to the vicinity of the
bridge. Defendant's Exhibit No. 29 shows this road as you
approach the bridge going east. The bridge is lower in elevation
and on a straight line with the road from the west. Plaintiff's
Exhibits No. 4 and 6 further illustrate the character of the
9
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road and bridge as you get nearer to it and the left turn on
the other side can be plainly seen because it is daytime, but
would present a different problem at night. Plaintiff's Exhibits
No. 7 and 8 show the road, as you come out on the east side
of the bridge and you can then see that there is a hard surfaced road that swings to the right as well as one that swings
to the left with loose gravel up in the "Y" that is created
by the two roads forking away from the one road on the east
side of the bridge. Pictures of this loose gravel were avoided
by the State when they took their pictures some week or so
after the accident, but Mr. Berchtold Sr. (Tr. 351-2) went
to the scene of the accident on the morning of April 17th, 1959,
with a number of people with cameras and pictures were
taken. He had been in Washington, D.C. on an assignment
with the Air Force and did not arrive home until late on the
evening of the 16th day of April, 1959 (Tr. 355). He searched
for marks upon the highway (Tr. 355) and found some marks
that are shown in defendant's Exhibit No. 24 (Tr. 356) and
there were other sets to the left of them, see defendant's
Exhibit No. 25, but none leading off the road to point of
accident. Officer Bair said that he and Officer Lee made test
skids on April 16th (Tr. 101-28):

((Q. Let me ask you, where did you make these tests?
A. Directly over the marks that were visible on
the highway.

Q. Directly over the same marks?
A. Yes, sir."

There are three exhibits of the defendant that show the
road as it looked on the morning of April 17th from the east
10
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side looking westerly toward the bridge. One is defendant's
Exhibit No. 35, looking in a straight line at the bridge which
puts the camera in loose gravel and to the left of the road that
goes to Smithfield. Defendant's Exhibit No. 24 which moves
the camera to the right, toward the Smithfield road, but still
in loose rocks and gravel, and defendant's Exhibit No. 25
which is further east, down the south side of the Smithfield
road showing the bridge, the intersection with the road going
to the south of the Smithfield road, the gravel and the tire
marks of the officer's car. Defendant's Exhibit No. 28 is a
picture taken at a little different angle of this same scene.
Reversing the camera and looking east from the loose gravel,
defendant's Exhibit No. 31, shows three main telephone poles
in the background with the one on the left being darker and
it is the pole that has been replaced. Defendant's Exhibits
No. 30, 32 and 33 are progressive pictures made with the
camera being moved east, each successive time, toward the
pole that has been replaced.
On the evening in question, the defendant approached
the bridge in his car with the other two people beside him.
He admitted that he increased his speed just shortly before
reaching the bridge upon the suggestion of one of the other
passengers (Tr. 52). He does not know the exact speed that
he was travelling when he reached the bridge, but felt that
everything was under control until he became disturbed on
which way the road turned after he started across the bridge
{Tr. 52). That he struck some loose gravel at which time he
made his turn to the left and found he was in trouble, thought
he had straightened it out, but all of a sudden it seemed like
he possibly hit his brake and something took hold of it as it
11
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was coming out and in just a moment he was off the road
and into the barow pit and the pleasant evening that was
being enjoyed several seconds before turned into a tragedy.
At the trial, the State, through Officer Bair, contended
that there were certain skid marks upon the highway (Tr. 3722). That he marked them with a red crayon where they began
and ended (Tr. 42-6). He claimed that the two marks were left
by the right side wheels of an automobile (Tr. 43-22). He said
they were two inches wide almost identical expect in length
(Tr. 44-3). He said they were eight inches apart (Tr. 44-25).
That he returned about noon the following day (Tr. 59-29).
That he was alone (Tr. 60-2). That he used a clip board and
a 100-foot tape ( T r. 60-16) . That he measured both marks
(Tr. 62-15). One started twenty inches prior to the other
(Tr. 62-32). That the one mark (the right one) had a total
length of 57 feet 10 inches before it went off the road (Tr.
62-27). The other mark started 20 inches after and had 77 feet
six inches contact with the road before it left the same (Tr.
63-4). He claimed they were eight inches apart (Tr. 63-19).
On voir dire (Tr. 66-18) he was asked what leaves the mark
or what is the mark composed of that is left on the road and
we have:
A. The mark is made of the tire, the heat of the
tire against the surface of the road.

Q. And you can get it from slowing the wheel less
than free wheeling?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Or you can get it from a side skid?
A. Yes, sir.
12
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Q. Or you can get it from clear locking of the
wheel?
A. Yes, sir.
Officer Bair said he measured the distance from where
the tire marks, or first tire, left the road into the barrow pit to
the first impact (Tr. 71-29) and it was 80 feet 10 inches to
some small trees. From the trees to a telephone pole further
east (T r. 72) it was 53 feet even and from there to where the
car came to rest further east it was 69 feet. The width of the
road varied from 22 feet 6 inches to 23 feet and was 22 feet
10 inches where the car left the road (Tr. 74). His measurements from the bridge, east, are given (Tr. 76). Straight across
the bridge the road is straight 200 ft., it is 332 ft. to the west
edge of the road turning right toward Benson and 639 feet
to the east side of this road that turns to Benson and 819 ft.
would be the measurement along the right side of the road
to the pole that was broken on the second impact. He prepared
a map, Exhibit No. 14, of a scale of one inch to ten feet. He
indicated the route of travel on this exhibit but said Tr. 79-28) :
A. The vehicle as it struck the pole changed its
course. It went from a right side bank slide into a left.

Q. The left side of the car then being the forward
part going sideways ?

A. Yes.
Q. With the left side of the car being ahead?
.A. At this point here after impact in this area here,
the vehicle changed directions."
This is further emphasized (Tr. 87-7):

13
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A. Yes, but, as I say, the car was going sideways
leaving gouges in the gravel as it went off .... "
On his Exhibit No. 14 he shows the two purported tire
marks and says that from where the marks started they were
to the left of the right edge of the oiled surface 4 ft. 6 inches
(Tr. 84-14).
Officer Bair said that Officer Lee helped him re-check his
measurements the afternoon of the day following the accident
(Tr. 89). They then attempted to take some measurements
of a cord 55 feet long along the purported .mark of 57 ft.
10 inches ( T r. 91-94) and claimed that from the middle ordinate of his cord to the tire mark was 4 inches. No measurements
of any purported cord of the 77 foot 6 inch tire mark was made
even though they were working with a 100-foot tape and why
a 55-foot cord was used no one knows. These two lines, or
right side tire marks of the vehicle, which, when analyzed have
some very peculiar characteristics become the basis of their
evidence.· They admit the right mark of the two is the right rear
wheel and the left one the front. They admit that there is a
distance of 10 feet between the front and rear wheel which
would mean that if they both commenced to lay down marks
at the same instant there would be a distance of 10 feet instead
of 20 inches between the beginning of the two marks. In addition to the measurements that were purported to be taken of
the tire marks, Officer Bair had a photographer take a picture
of them the night of the accident. They were not offered in by
the State but were by the defendant, Exhibits No. 22 and 23,
and Officer Bair could not identify any tire marks in them.
They admit and testify that the first mark began 4 feet 6 inches
to the left of the oiled surface (Tr. 84-14) and ran off the oiled
14
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surface in 57 feet 10 inches which would make a triangle with
a base of 4 feet 6 inches if the edge of the oiled surface was
a continuous straight line. Also they allege that the other tire
was 8 inches further left and ran off the road 77 feet 6 inches
up the road which would make a triangle with a base of
5 feet 2 inches if the oiled surface was a continuous straight
line. However, and this is very important, the edge of the oiled
surface was on a curve (see plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14 and
defendant's Exhibit No. 36). To show the true base of a
triangle Officers Lee and Bair were requested to plat on a
large piece of paper on the floor in front of the jury (Tr. 130 to
154), defendant's Exhibit No. 21 and to do so they were asked
to draw a straight line along the south side of the road on
Exhibit No. 14 going westerly from a point east from where
the wheels of the car left the road. This straight line to represent the south edge of the oiled surface, if the road were
straight and not on a curve and from that line they then
measured to the north to where they had plotted the first
mark of the tire on Exhibit No. 14 and they had 12 feet (Tr.
133-7). This was then plotted on defendant's Exhibit No. 21
and the left tire mark was plotted 8 inches to the left and
20 inches up which established a true base of a right triangle.
The distances where each tire left the edge of the road was
then platted and lines drawn showing the height of one triangle
approximately 22 feet greater than the other, all to a scale of
one inch equals one foot. It was then demonstrated the physical
impossibility of the right front wheel staying 8 inches parallel
to the right rear wheel until the right rear wheel left the road
and the right front wheel continuing up the road another
22 feet before leaving especially when the right front wheel
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is ahead, due to wheel base of 119 inches or approximately
10 feet (Tr. 153-13). Officer Bair admitted (Tr. 153, lines
19-26) that if the car were travelling on a true circle that the
front wheel would have to be on the gravel portion of the road
when the rear wheel was laying its mark down at the end of
his 55-foot cord. With that admission, all of Dr. Wood's
testin1ony, as will be shown later in the argument, was strictly
speculative.
In addition, Officer Bair, on the same day that he was
supposed to have taken all of the measurements of the purported tire marks, filed his official report with the State of
Utah, defendant's Exhibit No. 27, besides other things he said:
((No solid brake marks visible prior to leaving road
surface."
Our pictures shown as Exhibits 24, 25, 28 and 36, taken
the 17th show the officers tire marks laid down the 16th, but
could not pick up any other except the officer's.
Now, to the pleadings, the information charges: (R. 5)
((That on or about the 15th day of April, 1959, at the
County of Cache, State of Utah, the said defendant
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully drive and
operate a motor vehicle in reckless disregard of the
safety of others by which one Nora Jean Christensen
received injury and whose death ensued within one
year as a proximate result of said in jury, contrary to
the provisions of the Statute of the State aforesaid, in
such cases made and provided, and against the peace
and dignity of the State of Utah."
To this a demand for a bill of particulars was made (R. 6)
and nparticularly as to what acts, if any, the defendant is
16
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alleged to have done so as to drive a motor vehicle in a reckless disregard of the safety of others." The bill of particulars,
as furnished ( R. 9) set out:
·'The defendant is alleged to have driven his motor
vehicle in excess of seventy miles per hour in the
nighttime on a road of such a route, course and condition with respect to width and curvature as existed at
and near the time and place of the injury resulting in
Nora Jean Christensen's death, and by failing to drive
under such conditions and in such a manner as to be
able to keep the automobile he was operating under
control and upon the traveled portion of the highway."
A motion to quash was filed (R. 10) and argued (Tr.
2, line 5 to page 5, line 20).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH FOR THE REASON
THAT THE INFORMATION AS MODIFIED BY THE
BILL OF PARTICULARS DOES NOT STATE A CRIMINAL
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL FOR
FAILURE TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION OR ERRED
IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
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STRUCTION NO. 1 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS
TO-WIT:

(a) THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS
WAS CONFLICTING.
(b) THAT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE OFFICERS PRESENTED AND PAR'fiCULARLY AS TO MEASURE!\1ENTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN AT THE SCENE OF
THE ACCIDENT WERE PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
BE AS ALLEGED.

(c) THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS, A PHYSICIST
OF THE USU, WAS BASED UPON A FALSE PREMISE,
TO-WIT: THAT THE MARKS WERE LAID DOWN
WHILE THE CAR OF THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVELlNG FREE OF SKIDS OR BRAKES ON THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF A PERFE~T CIRCLE FOR A DISTANCE OF
A FIFTY FIVE FOOT CORD ON SAID CIRCUMFERENCE.
(d) THAT THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS WAS
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND CAUSED THE JURY TO
BE INFLUENCED AND SPECULATE ON ITS VERDICT.

(e) THAT THERE IS NO TESTIMONY IN THE RECORD THAT THE DEFENDANT EVER EXCEEDED THE
SPEED OF 65 MILES PER HOUR IN A POSTED 60 MILE
DAY SPEED ZONE AND THEN SUCH SPEED WAS ONLY
MOMENTARY. THAT SPEED ALONE OF THIS SLIGHT
VARIATION FROM THE POSTED SPEED IS NOT {{RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS.''

(f) THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS THE RESULT OF
A MOMENTARY INDECISION OF THE DRIVER AFTER
18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

HE REACHED GRAVEL DEPOSITS NEGLIGENTLY LEFT
BY HIGHWAY OFFICIALS IN THE "Y" OF FORKING
ROADS AS TO WHICH WAY THE ROAD WAS GOING.
THAT SAID ACT WAS AT MOST NEGLIGENCE AND
NOT HEEDLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF
OTHERS.

(g) THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OF A HEEDLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY
OF OTHERS IN THE DRIVING OF THE DEFENDANT.
(h) THAT THE COURT, AFTER ALLOWING HIGHLY SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED TO
THE JURY, WAS OBLIGATED TO TAKE SAID CASE
FROM THE JURY TO PROHIBIT THEM FROM SPECULATING IN MAKING THEIR DECISION.

POINT III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE, IN ITS ENTIRETY, DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 FOR THE REASON THAT SAID INSTRUCTION IS A TRUE STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND THE
JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
UPON IT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH FOR THE REASON
19
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THAT THE INFORMATION AS MODIFIED BY THE
BILL OF PARTICULARS DOES NOT STATE A CRIMINAL
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
Our Section 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended reads:
"41-6-43.1 0 Negligent homicide-Death occurring

within one year-Penalty-Revocation of license or
privilege to drive.-( a) When the death by any person
ensues within 1 year as a proximate result of injury
received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating
such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide."
In this regard the charge is:
«(That on or about the 15th day of April, 1959, at
the County of Cache, State of Utah the said defendant
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, drive and
operate a motor vehicle in reckless disregard of the
safety of others by which one Nora Jean Christensen
received in jury and whose death ensued within one year
as a proximate result of said injury, contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the State aforesaid, in such
cases made and provided, and -against the peace and
dignity of the State of Utah."
And then his bill of particulars is added:
nThe defendant is alleged to have driven his motor
vehicle in excess of 70 miles per hour in the night time
on a road of such a route, course and condition with
respect to width and curvature as existed at and near
the time and place of the injury, resulting in death
to Nora Jean Christensen, and that by failing to drive
under such conditions in such a manner as to be able
to keep the auton1obile he was operating under control, and upon the travelled portion of the highway."
20
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He alleges two things, one, that he drove in excess of 70
miles per hour in the night time and the other that he failed to
keep his car under control and upon the travelled portion of
the highway. Hem entioned something about width and curvature, but nothing is set out and you cannot tell from the pleadings, whether the width is one foot or twenty or thirty feet;
whether the curvature is based upon a radius of 100, 500,
1000 or 1500 feet. The statute required the individual to be
guilty of driving the vehicle in a reckless disregard of the
safety of others. It is this recklessness that should have been
set out, as was said in State vs. Adams, 12 5 P2d 430, left
hand column, near the bottom:
Criminal negligence therefore sufficient to satisfy arm (a) of the manslaughter definition means more
than mere thoughtlessness or slight carelessness. It
means reckless conduct or conduct evincing a marked
disregard for the safety of others."
u •••

The bill of particulars did not clarify the issue, it just confused the issue. As a matter of law an increase of up to 70
miles an hour in and of itself is not reckless, disregard of the
safety of others. There are no cases exactly in point on this,
but we do have other cases where the matter has been gone
into, such as the guest statute regarding civil liability. Our guest
statute, Section 41-9-1- Utah Code Annotated 1953 reads in
part:
for injury to or death of such guest proximately
resulting from the intoxication or wilful misconduct
of such owner, driver or person responsible for the
operation of such vehicle; . . .''
n •••

There have been numerous civil cases tried, particularly in
surrounding states, where the guests have sued the owner and
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alleged wilfull misconduct of such owner in his driving for
the purpose of taking the matter out of the guest statute. In
the cases to be cited hereinafter, speed in particular has been
quite a factor. I use these cases because wilfull misconduct has
been used similarly to the words ccreckless, disregard of the
safety of others" and in civil cases if speed alone would not
take it out of the guest statute, then most surely in a criminal
case where intent must be proved or presumed from the acts,
then a momentary increase of speed alone should not make a
person guilty of the offense.

A very interesting case is Roberts vs. Brown et al, California February 7, 1949, 9 P2d 288. In this case the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant was driving 60 miles per hour
and he requested him to slow down and that he did slow down
to 50 miles per hour and rolled the car over and the people
were hurt. The court, on page 291, summarized a lot of cases
that had been determined in California, and we have:
tc

(2) From the foregoing summary, it appears that

the premise upon which plaintiff bases his claim of
wilful misconduct of defendant is the speed at which
defendant drove. Excessive speed alone, unattended by
circumstances indicating an intention to injure, or a
wanton disregard for the safety of, the guest, is insufficient to constitute actionable wilful misconduct.
The fact that a motorist in a Cord car raced at 73
miles per hour, in a fog, drove on the left side of the
highway near a Ctslow" sign to pass another speeding
car and then returned to the right-hand lane where his
Cord collided with a Dodge standing across the highway did not constitute wilful misconduct and judgement for defendant notwithstanding the verdict should
have been entered. McLeod v. Dutton, 13 Cal. App.
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2d, 545, 57 P2d 189. Where a driver proceeded at 60
miles per hour and the road was fifteen feet wide and
was bounded by soft shoulders and the guest remonstrated at the defendant's attempt to pass a car, defendant continued laughing at and ignorant of her perils,
it did not appear that she knew or should have known
that injury was probable. Hall v. Mazzei, 14 Cal. App.
2d 48, 57 P2d 948. A driver, 21 years of age, had been
driving six years; he proceeded on a wet, slippery
pavement at 35 miles per hour; his car, in good condition, did not skid until he turned to avoid an approaching car when it ran off the highway and got out
of his control and overturned. He thought he could
drive safely but did not believe ccthat any serious
injury was probable." Although he was mistaken and
although cche may ... have disregarded the possible
consequences of his act, such disregard was due to
carelessness rather than to wantonness and recklessness, and was undoubtedly based upon his belief that
no injury was probable." Howard v. Howard 132 Cal.
App. 124, 22 P2d 279, 281. Another driver neglected
to inspect his truck after notice of a defective rear
end, and while descending a 6 per cent grade at 20
miles per hour, something suddenly gave way. The
truck proceeded with motor compression. He lost control, became frantic, and the truck jumped the bank,
overturned and the driver and his guest were both
injured. It was held that no wilful misconduct was
shown. Turner vs. Standard Oil, 134 Cal. App. 622,
25 P2d 988.
cc ( 3) It must be shown that (Csuch acs were done
under circumstances disclosing know ledge, express or to
be implied, that an injury to a guest will be a probable
result." McLeod v. Dutton, supra (13 Cal. App. 2d
545, 57 P2d 191). The factors necessary to prove wilful
misconduct are ( 1) that the driver intentionally did
something in driving that he should not have done or
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( 2) that he failed to do what he should have done,
under the circumstances express or implied "that an
injury to a guest will be a probable result." Hall v.
Mazzei, supra ( 14 Cal. App. 2d 48, 57 P2d 950);
Turner v. Standard Oil supra. For an act to be wilful
misconduct, it must be an intentional act with a knowledge, that serious in jury is a probable result, or an
intentional act with a wanton and reckless disregard
of its possible result. Howard v. Howard, supra. USuch
intent and knowledge of probable injury may not be
inferred from the facts in every case showing an act or
omission constituting negligence.... " Meek v. Fowler,
3 Cal. 2d 420 at page 426, 45 P2d 194 at page 197.
\Vhere excessive speed appears to be attributable to a
lack of care and not to a disregard of the probable consequences, the driver is not guilty of wilful misconduct.
Lennon v. Woodbury, 3 Cal. App. 2d 595, 40 P2d 292.
"The mere failure to perform a statutory duty is not,
alone, wilful misconduct. . . . To constitute twilful
misconduct' there must be actual knowledge ... of the
peril to be apprehended from the failure to act ...
to the end of averting injury." Wright v. Sellers, 25
Cal. App. 2d 603, 608, 78 P2d 209, 212.
( 7) Therefore, the defendant, though negligent,
could not be said to have intended probable injury to
his guests. They were congenial friends, enjoying together the harmony of a convivial evening; traveling
to a place where they proposed to extend its delights.
With no houses to the south; no traffic to reckon with;
with a dangerous jog in the curb concealed from view
by aeolian deposits; with no lines to guide, no signs
or markin~s to warn of the lurking dangers, the slig~t
est neglect might have resulted in disaster. But while
it was a situation that might have required extraordinary
care to insure ones own safety, there was nothing to
indicate that defendant knew that injury to his guest
would probably result from his thus driving along said
2·l
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approach to said intersection. Turner v. Standard Oil,
supra. Certainly, a jury's finding that he intended no
such mischief or that he did not proceed wantonly is
abundantly justified.''
There is another case that is practically identical with
the facts that \Ve have in this case, but was civil in character
and not criminal. As I said before, a criminal case should even
be more favorable to my client, than a civil one. This case is
Gill v. Hayes, 108 P2d 117, Oklahoma, 1940, where they
applied the New Mexico law. The facts of this case were: That
the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's car. Plaintiff alleged
that the defendant drove the car in the night time upon a
curved pavement, 70 miles per hour, in violation of the maximum speed without being able to see curved condition of the
road and while the same was damp, wet and slippery, without
tires equipped with proper treads or chains and without proper
brake adjustments. The car hit the curve, the brakes were
applied and it rolled several times. Several other people were
in the car, besides the plaintiff and defendant, who were going
on a trip. The court said on page 120:
"(2) Nearly all the courts passing upon this identical statute have held that the word "heedlessness" as
there used is to be read in connection with c c reckless
disregard of the rights of others" and that in order to
create liability~ the acts of the operator causing the
accident must be something beyond mere negligence;
and something approaching wilful or wanton misconduct.
The only respect in which the attitude of one whose
acts are in heedless and reckless disregard of the rights
of others is less blameworthy than that of the inten25
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tional wrongdoer is that instead of affirmatively wishing to injure another, he is merely willing to do so.
The evidence in this case shows that plaintiff and
defendant were friends of some years standing. They
had taken a number of automobile trips together,
sometimes the one and sometimes the other being
((guest rider.'' There was riding with defendant, besides
plaintiff, his wife, his sister and his cousin, all alike his
guests.
We would not hesitate to hold that there was evidence sufficient to require submission to the jury were
it only a question of defendant's negligence.
( 3) Measured by the construction of every other
court which has construed the statute we are unwilling
to say that the evidence in this case, though sufficient
to show negligence in its ordinary sense, was sufficient
to show a willingness to inflict injury on plaintiff or
any of his other guests.
There is a California case with facts a good deal like ours,
which is Katz v. Kuppin, 112 P2d 681, California 1941. The
facts in that case are that plaintiff drove a coupe with two
guests at 2 A.M. upon a wide paved boulevard. The weather
was clear and dry and the moon bright and he was going in
excess of 70 miles per hour. He hit a curve and ran off the
road because of speed. The plaintiff claimed the accident was
the result of defendant's wilfull misconduct. The court said
on page 282, right hand column:
(( ( 6) Wilful tnisconduct is not to be inferred from
the circumstances detailed in this case. Where a motorist
had been requested to reduce his speed, raced with
another car at a speed exceeding 50 miles per hour
on a foggy night, pulled to the wrong side of the
road at a speed of 73 miles per hour, intentionally
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disregarded the "slow" sign to pass his rival in the race,
then collided with a third car crossing the highway,
it was held that these facts, standing alone, did not
constitute wilful misconduct. Under such circumstances,
the record must further show that such acts were done
under circumstances disclosing knowledge on the part
of defendant that an injury to his guest would be a
probable result. McLeod v. Dutton, 13 Cal. App. 2d
545, 57 P2d 189. This and kindred authorities establish the law to be that, in the absence of proof of ( 1)
a positive intention to injure his guests, or ( 2) his
wanton disregard for their safety, the fact of his driving
at an excessive speed on a dry, wide highway, free of
traffic in the early hours of the morning, in the bright
moonlight, even though objections were voiced to the
rate of his travel, will not establish wilful misconduct.
Newman v. Solt, 8 Cal. App. 2d 50, 47 P2d 289;
Hall v. Mazzei, 14 Cal. App. 2d 48, 57 P2d, 948;
Lennon v. Woodbury, 3 Cal. App. 2d 595, 40 P2d;
Robertson v. Brown, 37 Cal. App. 2d 189, 99 P2d 288.
( 7, 8) Admitting the truth of plaintiffs evidence,
as we must (Marchetti v. Southern Pac. Co., 204 Cal.
679, 269 P. 529) they did not establish wilful misconduct on the part of the defendant. The facts are clear
and from them only one inference can be drawn.
Hence, the issue became one of law to be determined
by the trial judge."
While I have used cases involving the guest statute, we
do have a Colorado case reported in 1956, Trujillo vs. People,
292 P2d 980, that laid down the rule that: The same degree
of negligence is required to sustain a charge of manslaughter
as is necessary to support the recovery in an action for damages
under automobile guest statute, the essential element in each
instance being a wanton and wilful disregard of the rights
and safety of others.
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Consequently, I have to say that the complaint, as set
out, when considered with the bill of particulars, did not in
and of itself state an offense against the defendant.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL FOR
FAlLURE TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION OR ERRED
IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS
TO-WIT:

(a) THAT THE 'fESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS
WAS CONFLICTING.

(b) THAT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE OFFICERS PRESENTED AND PARTICULARLY AS TO MEASUREMENTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN AT THE SCENE OF
THE ACCIDENT WERE PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
BE AS ALLEGED.
The writer will take up (a) and (b) of Point II first:
Officer Blair stated (Tr. 42-3):
nA. After we walked back to the marks that we
observed prior, I went over in my car and picked up a
red crayon and the other officers remained there at the
marks. I went back over, and to the best of our ability
we marked those right at the very end where they
appeared to start and where they finished, so that I
could find them easier.·'
nA. The two marks were the marks left by the
right side wheels of an automobile." (Tr. 43-22)
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"A. Yes, these marks were--they were two inches
wide.

Q. They. Now you say "they." How many of them
were there?
A. There were two marks. Two marks. They appeared to be almost identical, except in length and-

Q. Almost identical except in length?
A. Yes." (Tr. 44-3)
"A. They were eight inches apart.

Q. Eight inches apart. And could you describe or
step to the board and draw it for the jury what you
saw, or in other words to give the appearance of these
lines?
A. Refer to this as the curve and the south side of
the road. This here is the south shoulder as the road
proceeds east. These marks that I observed were located
to the right side of the road or the south side of the
road running parallel to one another." ( T r. 44-2 5)
CCA. The right mark or the south mark, which was
twenty inches longer in length and the inside-

Q. Twenty inches longer?
A. I should say it started twenty inches prior to the
second mark." (Tr. 62-19)
"A. And the total lenght of that mark was 57-10.
That's where it went off the road, with no further contact with the mark on the road. (Tr. 62-27)
etA. The other mark, as I say, was twenty inchesstarted twenty inches prior-or after the first mark,
was seventy-seven, six total contact with the road.
(Tr. 63-4)

"Q. Did you make any measurements with respect
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to the mark that was inside or closer to the center of
the highway then?
A. It was measured, as I say, at the same time,
measurements, this mark run parallel to this one. This
one here was used in preference to this one for a
particular reason.

Q. Well, we're not interested in the reason. Just
tell us what you did.
A. The arc of this one was not figured, only this
one, but there were measurements made between to
show they were parallel and equal.

Q. There were measurements made where?
A. Measurements of the total length, also in relation
to this one. That they were running parallel and the
distance between them was the same, eight inches all
the way through.

Q. How many of those measurements did you make?
A. The measurements across was periodic. I didn't
go ten feet. I'd go probably two steps. Approximately
ten feet. And I checked it periodically all the way
through to see if it did vary.

Q. Did it vary?

A. No." (Tr. 95-2)
The court's attention is called to the fact that the testimony
is taken from the transcript given by Officer Blair on the marks
that were supposed to be laid down. In summary, the right one
sarts first and travels 57 feet 10 inches before it leaves the
oiled surface. The other, the left one, starts 20 inches up the
road and 8 inches left and goes 77 feet 6 inches up the road
before it leaves the oiled road. They are exactly 8 inches apart,
according to Officer Blair, and this parallel distance continues
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all the way through and the officer determined that both lines
made the same kind of curve so he determined the arc of just
the right line on the pure assumption that it would make no
difference which line they used. On cross examination he was
asked:

"Q. You want them to believe that these two lines
as they proceeded, proceeded right parallel and they
had the same degree of curve, both of them?
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 129-4)

··Q. Now if I understand you, you only measured
the right wheel?
A. For the middle ordinant, yes.
Q. You didn't measure the left?
A. No.
Q. You felt that it was exactly the same because
the lines paralleled each other ?
A. That's right.
Q. And they continued to parallel until it came
right up and run off the cement?
A. Yes, sir." (T'r. 130-5)
It was then that he and Officer Lee were asked to plat
on a large piece of paper on the floor in front of the jury,
defendant's exhibit No. 21, to a scale of one inch equals one
foot.
The officers drew a straight line on a long piece of paper
(Tr. 131) which would represent the south edge of an oil
strip of road, if the road were in a straight line running east
and west. The officers were then requested to step to the board
and on their own exhibit No. 14 made by them of the accident
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scene, they laid a ruler parallel and along the south edge of the
oiled road at the point where their exhibit shows the car
wheels leaving the road. The ruler being straight could not
follow the curve of the road, but would represent the south
side of the road if the road were straight. Then from this
straight line they measured left to the beginning marks that
they had platted on their Exhibit No. 14 and the distance
scaled 12 feet. They were then requested to put the first distance
reported 57 feet 10 inches on the larger scale (Tr. 135-28) to
a point where it would cross off the edge of the oil. This was
the right rear tire and a straight line was drawn and then
(Tr. 136-137-138) the four inch ordinate was laid off on a
cord of 55 feet of the first part of this line. Next the other
purported tire mark was platted on the big scale (Tr. 138139) and when they platted it starting 20 inches further up
the highway and 8 inches left of the first mark, if it remained
parallel and the distance was 77 feet 6 inches where it was
supposed to leave the oiled surface we found it was utterly
impossible for it would put the nose of the car down into the
barrow pit (Tr. 139-19). The front wheel is approximately
10 feet in front of the back wheel and if it stayed upon the
oiled surface and did not leave the oil for an additional 22
feet, see Exhibit No. 21, then it would be physically impossible
for the two tire marks to be parallel. In summary, we could
say: The left front tire mark made by the right front tire,
if it stays parallel and 8 inches to the rear of the right rear
wheel for 57 feet 10 inches as testified by Officer Blair (Tr.
95-13-15) would have to leave the oiled road just a little
further up the road. Just a little over eight inches from where
the rear tire left the road, or the two marks were not parallel.
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Consequently the marks would have to continue to get wider
apart with the rear of the car 1noving further to the right until
it goes off the road and the front of the car staying on for
approximately 22 more feet.
The officer, after further cross examination, was asked
a question about the wheel base of this car, which was actually
119 inches or one inch short of ten feet and then was asked:

ceQ. So that the front wheel, as it lays down its
mark, is ten feet ahead of the rear wheel, is it not?
A. Approximately.

Q. And if it were right up here uniform and laying
down a mark and on the same curve that you have,
if there were ten feet on it, and if it were on the same
curve right up to the fifty-five feet, it would have to
be on the gravel, would it not, at the time the rear
one laid the same mark down?
A. That would be difficult to answer. If you're
figuring the road as perfectly true, that may be right.

Q. Sure.
A. If the edge of the road is perfectly straight.

Q. But I take it from your statement now that they
were laying these marks down and they were traveling,
and if those marks were right there when you got up
to fifty-five feet, that front of that car has got to be
out across the oil on the side, has it not? With ten
feet more length?
A. I don't know." (Tr. 153-16)
I believe the officer at this point was telling the truth
when he said CCI don't know." The recordings of the measurements taken show beyond all doubt that there was a grave
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error in them some place, and with this error so apparent the
court should not have allowed the jury to speculate upon it,
and to use these figures as the basis for Dr. Wood's testimony.

POINT II

(c) THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS, A PHYSICIST
OF THE USU, WAS BASED UPON A FALSE PREMISE,
TO-WIT: THAT THE MARKS WERE LAID DOWN
WHILE THE CAR OF THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVELlNG FREE OF SKIDS OR BRAKES ON THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF A PERFECT CIRCLE FOR A DISTANCE OF
A FIFTY FIVE FOOT CORD ON SAID CIRCUMFERENCE.
(d) THAT THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS WAS
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND CAUSED THE JURY TO
BE INFLUENCED AND SPECULATE ON ITS VERDICT.
Both points will be covered in the argument at the same time.

To set this case up for the physicist some groundwork
had to be laid and of course it is this 55 foot cord on a purported circle that the officer was trying to work into. On page
182 of the transcript and beginning with line 2, we have:

nQ. Well, you were measuring the outside mark
on the theory that I'm going to establish the diameter
of a circle, are you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're fixing that diameter in regard to the
radius of the center of the circle?
A. Yes.''
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The officer was further interrogated as to whether or not
the car had to be travelling this circle, and as to whether or
not braking, letting up on the gas, or even slight braking
would have an effect. Then on page 183 of the transcript he
was asked if he subscribed to the findings of the Traffic Accident
Investigation Manual for Police, put out by the Traffic Insti·
tute of Northwestern University. Then on page 184, line 23
of the transcript, we have:
MR. MANN: Article five-two-four-fifty, I'm giving
you, page 433, and I'm reading in the middle of the
article on the left side column of the two-column
page: CCI£ brakes are applied even a little the vehicle
will slide at a lower speed, because both the curve and
the brakes tend to make it slide. If the skidding occurs
only when brakes are applied, the estimate of critical
speed has little meaning." Do you subscribe to that
theory?
A. I wouldn't attempt to argue with the book."
Consequently we have this, there are two marks left, both
on the right side of the vehicle. The front tire mark is laid
down to the left of the rear tire mark. We know nothing about
the position of the other two tires. The officer was asked in
transcript 189 line 16:

ceQ. And can you say that if a car travels down the
road and there's a slight mark with the right wheel,
it won't show up in a photograph at night, that the
left wheel is off the ground ?
A. That would still be my assumption, yes.

Q. Thafs a plain assumption, isn't it?
A. Thafs my opinion, yes.

Q. Just speculation, isn't it?
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A. I wouldn't hardly say it was speculation.

Q. WellMR. CALDERWOOD: He asked him the question and got his answer. I object to the repetition.
THE COURT: Go ahead.

Q. You weren't in the car, were you?
A. The car that was damaged?

Q. Yes.
A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't see the accident?
A. I sure didn't.

Q. You just saw some marks after?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you want to conclude that the left wheels
were off the ground
THE COURT: Off the-

Q. Off the oil.
A. As I say, I do not know. There were no marks
visible. Whether they were off or not I don't know.

Q. And they could have been on?
A. It's possible. I don't know. There were no marks
to indicate that they were.''
Dr. Wood was later brought on as the expert witness, and
over defendant's objections and commenced to tell about certain
tests on the vehicle at the USU campus. These tests included
the turning of the vehicle at a sudden turn laying down some
marks upon the highway, and the taking of certain measure36
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ments to one of the tire marks laid down under said tests.
On page 278 of the transcript, line 22, we have:

"Q. When you speak of a cord of the first and
the last, which wheel did you follow to establish that
cord?
A. The right front, I believe it was.
Q. Right front?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you follow the right rear wheel?
A. I didn't think that was necessary, because by
observation these were parallel, and parallelness can
be detected quite accurately.
Q. Which wheel made the biggest arc?

A. Which wheel made the bigger arc?
Q. Yep.

A. I believe it was the right rear.
Q. Made the bigger arc?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, doctorA. I don't know. I say I believe it was the-Q. Now you've been teaching physics all these years
and you don't know which wheel makes the bigger
arc?
A. The arc that we measured was the one nearest
the center of the curve.
Q. You don't know which wheel made it?
A. No.
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Q. Well, then was your test effective? You've got
two arcs there, haven't you?

A. That's right.
Q. And one is made by the front wheel and one by
the back?

A. That's right.
Q. And they have to be in certain positions, don't
they?

A. Yes.
Q. And you say you measured the smaller or the
larger?

A. We measured the smaller one.
Q. And you say you thought that was the front
wheel?

A. I thought so, yes. I didn't check it.
Q. (Drawing on the blackboard) Well, now, this
car has wheels in the front and it has wheels on the
back, doesn't it? That's your measurement.
A. Yes.
Q. The black wheels run throughout a solid axle,
don't they?

A. That's right.
Q. They can't turn?

A. That's right.
Q. The front wheel has to turn?

A. Which is front and which is back?
Q. The car going in that direction (drawing). Now,
when that car starts to make a turn, it does it on the
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bases where we're going to find the center of that
radius in relation to a horizontal line?
A. Yes.

Q. And that's run through the back wheels, isn't it,
the solid part?
A. If we're measuring those, yes.

Q. Now when those front wheels turn and we
decide to determine the way that car is going, we create
a triangle "~j~}: the use of that car as a base, do we
not?
A. This can be done, yes.

Q. Well, that is done, isn't it, tn any curve, any
driving of that automobile ?
A. I don't follow that at all.

Q. Well, if this car starts to turn and comes around
in this circle (illustrating on the blackboard), these
here are going to go this way, are they not?
A. Yes, I believe they would.

Q. And the front wheel has always got to be to
the right of· the rear wheels, is that correct, so we get
it in the record?
A.

Yes~

I presume that's correct.

Q. So that all the tests that you made up here, doctor,
would be that the arc of the front wheel was the outside and the arc of the rear wheel was inside; is that
correct?
A. Will you state the question again?

Q. Well, any turning of the curve that you made
up here on your test, the arc of the--the curve that the
outside front wheel would make would be outside of
the curve or the outside of the back right wheel?
39
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Yeah.

Q. Just like I've drawn it?
A. Yes.

Q. If I take it out and drive it in the snow it will
do that same thing, won't it?
A. Yeah.

Q. And the reason for it is that we have old triangle question. We start out here with this as the
base, this is the right side and this is the hypotenuse
and right out here to the front wheels is going to be
a longer distance than the point where we hit the center
of the radius, isn't it?
A. That's right.

Q. Now, doctor, do you know whether or not this
curve that these people have brought in to you was
made by the right wheel or the left wheel and which
side they had them on ?
A. I was not concerned with that.

Q. Now if they have the wrong wheel on the wrong
side they're in a skid rather than in aA. Oh, certainly not, no. You haven't made this
a skid.
Q. No, I've done it just like you've drawn it.
MR. CALDERWOOD: Who drew it?
A. I didn't draw it.

Q. Just like I've drawn it, and I've drawn it just like
a car will turn without skidding.
A. Yes.

Q. Now, if I'm going to have this tire on the inside,
I've got to have my car pointed the other way when
40
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I start this circle. So that this tire will be on the outside and I've got to skid rather than drive it, have I
not, to have the rear wheel outside of the front one?
A. If you want to set up those conditions, I presume you'd do that."
Consequently I would say this, that Dr. Wood came in
with only one thought in mind, that is: The assumption that
the car was travelling, speeding aorund the outside of a circle,
not skidding in any way, tra veiling exact! y as a car would
if it is being driven not if it is in any type of skid. He admits
upon the blackboard after the matter has been brought to his
mind for the first time, that the front wheel in any kind of a
turn, due to the fact that the turning is made from the front
wheels alone and is turned through solid back wheels that a
triange is formed, and that the outside front wheel will make
a larger circle than the outside rear wheel, so that if the car
is traveling freely, but not skidding the front wheel must be
on the outside of the circle and not be inside as the officers
had testified.
From a check of the transcript you will discover that the
doctor went on and testified, basing his theory entirely upon
the fact that the car was speeding; travelling around a curve
and travelling at such a speed as to lay down tire marks with
the outside tires from speed and not from skids. The court
allowed him, over the defendant's objections (Tr. 292, line 17)
to testify as to the speed of this vehicle, based upon testimony
and marks which show conclusively that the marks were either
from skids or brakes or both. One line 24, page 292 of the
transcript he testified 110 miles an hour as the minimum speed
and he sets out his theory (Tr. 293, line 27) and gives the
41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

radius of the circle (Tr. 296, line 18) as 1134 feet. He admits
(Tr. 297) that if the officer made a slight mistake in measuring
the ordinate of the arc, that the radius could be reduced 200
feet by one inch error. He admits (Tr. 300 line 2) that the
radius of the curve actually on the road was 717 feet. He
admitted (Tr. 301) that with the shorter radius as compared
to a larger radius, that a car travelling at the same speed
would lay a mark down quicker on the shorter radius of the
curve yet that there were no marks on this particular curve,
which has been negotiated practically to its conclusion with
a radius of 717 feet until all of a sudden some slight marks
show up and he tells us that the radius of that mark is 1134
feet. Consequently we would have to conclude that in this
particular case, the driver went around a sharp curve without
leaving a mark and all of a sudden went into a big wide open
curve and left a mark. Common sense tells us these marks
made by tires on one side which are crossed from normal driving
could only happen from one thing, and this is the skid, or
brake pedal (Tr. 302).
The dcxtor was further examined (Tr. 303 line 13):

ttQ.

Now I've got to go back to that formula,
doctor, if that's the case. The formula that you gave
me the other day, you figured 133 miles, did you not?

A. Yes.
Q. Now, you figure a hundred tenA. Now refresh my memory on this.
Q. Well, you were sworn over to the preliminary
hearing.
A. Yes.
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Q. And you brought a formula forward, and in that
formula, on page sixty-eight, line twenty, you testify
as to speed of that automobile, didn't you?
A. Yes.

Q. And you brought a formula forward, and in that
formula, on page sixty-eight, line twenty, you testify
as to speed of that automobile, didn't you?
A. Yes.

Q. And at that time you had 133 miles?
A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. And they asked you this question: tcNow,
ing, doctor, that the radius, or curvature, of
mark by a motor vehicle is 1134 and so on . .
what is that opinion? Answer: 133 miles per
That's correct, isn't it?

assuma tire
." and
hour."

A. There were some other conditions associated
with that, I think.

Q. Well, you did give that speed, 133 miles an hour,
didn't you?
A. There were some other conditions.

Q. You can answer my question. You gave that as
the speed?
MR. CALDERWOOD: Well, I object to it as
irrelevant and immaterial. It's not the same form of
question.
MR. MANN: Well, we've now had our speed
reduced to 110 and it was 133 over there.
MR. CALDERWOOD: Well, I object to this as
immaterial argument to the jury. The factors which
the doctor took under consideration are not shown
to be the same.
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THE COURT: You'll have to prove that. He
can ask him if he testified to that over there.
MR. CALDERWOOD: Well, it's immaterial what
he testified to.
MR. MANN: It is not immaterial.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
A. This was one of nine values that I reported, I
believe.

Q. You even got it up to 160 miles over there, didn't
you?
A. That's right, yes."
There was diligent cross examination thereafter as to
shifting of weights; the various speeds and how he reached them
and in transcript 309 line21 , we have this question:

HQ. No, I'm asking you. I don't care whether they
asked you. You don't know yourself whether there was
any weight on the left wheels touching the cement;
is that it?
A. No, I don't know whether there was any weight
or not.

Q. And you don't know whether there was any
weight tipped up on the car so that it was on two
wheels and the car was tipped up at forty-five degrees
or something of that nature?
A. No.

Q. So that you have to assume whether the car was
up in the air or down and actually touching on the left
wheels?
A. Yes."
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The defendant employed a Mr. Keith A. Hansen, a professional engineer, to make a complete survey of the scene of
the accident. His qualifications are set out on page 364 of the
transcript. He was asked if he could plat the two lines that
the state were relying on on his Exhibit No. 36 (Tr. 367368) and he advised that you could not keep them parallel
and still cause them to go off the cement at the points designated
without some sudden change taking place. He was asked to plot
on his exhibit a circle with a radius of 1134 feet (Tr. 371)
through the purported tire marks and see if that course were
followed if the same would follow the road, which it would
not. One of the officers had suggested that the car cut corners,
that is, did not follow the true radius of the road, but went
from the outside to the inside and back to the outside. Consequently I had the engineer plot a course on his exhibit (Tr.

372-3) with variations of travel and had a radius varying
between 663 and 758 feet as compared with Dr. Woods of
1134 feet. He was also asked about the position of tire travel,
in regard to the front and rear wheels on the right side of a
car travelling in a circle, with a radius of 78 feet (Tr. 374)
and he said the right front tire would be to the left of the
right rear tire eight inches. The position of these tires is just
opposite than in our case. He was also asked about the position
of the tires of a car travelling in a circle with a radius of 1134
feet (Tr. 374) and the right front tire would be approximately
one inch on the outside of the right rear tire. He was asked,
(Tr. 375-27):

nQ.

From a mathematical equation, Mr. Hansen,
can you compute the travel of a vehicle with a radius
of 1134 feet and have the back wheel traveling eight
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inches on the outside of the front wheel, for the
whole distance, without assumingA. Not without assuming something.

Q. And what do you mean by that?
A. In order for the rear wheels to get on the outside
of the front wheels, some forces had to act on that
vehicle or that body to change its position. I would
have to assume that the force had acted and then was
remaining constant throughout the path.

Q. And held it there?
A. And held it there, yes."
See a further explanation in transcription 387-388.
The professional engineer for the defendant made up to
scale a plastic shape of an automobile 17¥2 feet long with holes
in the approximate location of the tires and the tires the
approximate width of the automobile. A demonstration was
made on Exhibit 21 by placing a pencil in the position of the
two right wheels ,Tr. 407) and moving it along the course
that the Officer Blair had testified that the car had taken. The
front wheel would of necessity reach the edge of the oiled road
first, and in order for it to stay on it would have to make a
sudden change in direction with the front so that it would
go up the hard surfaced road another approximate 22 feet.
Consequently the testimony of Dr. Woods was based upon
a false premise to-wit: That the car was traveling on the outside
of a circle with a radius of 1134 feet without the side skid
or brake being applied; that it held that course while traveling
in a normal manner and that the marks left were the result of
side pressure created from an even speed being held uniformly
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throughout the distance; that the speed would vary from 110
to 160 miles per hour. That the many controversies in the
testimony of the officers and the measurements taken together
with the fact that the car, as it left the oiled edge, was going
into a right side bank (Tr. 79-28) prove that the permise was
false and full of speculation. This spirit of speculation became
the prevalent theme before the court and the jury took it with
them to the jury room.

POINT II
(e) THAT 'fHERE IS NO TESTIMONY IN THE RECORD THAT THE DEFENDANT EVER EXCEEDED THE
SPEED OF 65 MILES PER HOUR IN A POSTED 60 MILE
DAY SPEED ZONE AND THEN SUCH SPEED WAS ONLY
MOMENTARY. THAT SPEED ALONE OF THIS SLIGHT
VARIATION FROM THE POSTED SPEED IS NOT nRECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS."
(f) THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS THE RESULT OF
A MOMENTARY INDECISION OF THE DRIVER AFTER
HE REACHED GRAVEL DEPOSITS NEGLIGENTLY LEFT
BY HIGHWAY OFFICIALS IN THE "Y" OF FORKING
ROADS AS TO WHICH WAY THE ROAD WAS GOING.
THAT SAID ACT WAS AT MOST NEGLIGENCE AND
NOT HEEDLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF
OTHERS.
(g) THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OF A HEEDLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY
OF OTHERS IN THE DRIVING OF THE DEFENDANT.
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I have set out in detail in the statement of facts the statement of Mr. Berchtold that he never once looked at the speedometer. That he did not believe that it was over sixty five
miles per hour, if it were that fast. Officer Bair claimed that
when he first talked with Mr. Berchtold, that Berchtold hin1
that he was going seventy, but that in his written statement he
said 65 miles. When Mr. Berchtold was placed on the stand
he was asked if he made a statement to Officer Bair, about
driving seventy miles per hour and he said: (Tr. 424-11) tcNo.
I says, I don't think I could have possibly been going more
than seventy miles an hour. I never stated the speed of seventy
miles an hour.''
The evidence is uncontradicted that up to just a moment
or two, before the accident, they were driving slowly. That
one of the passengers said the other girl would be in bed
if they didn't pick up the speed. That the passengers were
looking at the Thiokol badge of the Forrest boy, which was in
their hands, and this badge was found at the scene of the
accident. That it was just an ordinary night where three young
people were very happy the moment before, but when they
came down across the bridge into a division of the roads
where one went left and the other right at slight angles from
each other, with loose gravel out in center of the fork, that
just one moment's hesitation tnade it so that the car reached
the loose gravel before a decision to turn left was made. Then
either from the loose gravel, the touching of the brakes, the
turning of the steering wheel in connection with these, the
car skidded own the embankment and struck a telephone pole
and the scene of joy and merriment changed to one of tragedy.
There is no recklessness and show -off-ness. There is a slight
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picking up of speed with indecision and perhaps poor judgment
being exercised, after the loose gravel was struck and the car
turned to the left. Where, under all of these stated facts, was
the conduct showing a marked disregard for the safety of
others, as required under State vs. Adams, 125 P2d 430?
There is none.

POINT II
(h) THAT THE COURT, AFTER ALLOWING HIGHLY SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED TO
THE JURY, WAS OBLIGATED TO TAKE SAID CASE
FROM THE JURY TO PROHIBIT THEM FROM SPECULATING IN MAKING THEIR DECISION.
The court in instruction No. 6 (R. 30) in the last paragraph said:
"You are not to indulge in speculation or guesses
as to the cause of the accident, or how or in what
manner it originated, but you are to determine this
cause solely upon the evidence presented. If you are
required to resort to speculation as to any factual issue
to be resolved by you, then reasonable doubt exists
in your mind as to the facts, and you should resolve
that issue in favor of the defendant."
It is the contention of counsel for the defendant that
the court understood the law and instructed the jury that they
should not speculate. But this is like locking the barn door
after the horse has been stolen. If Dr. Wood's testimony was
stricken then they had no case whatsoever to stand on, as to
speeds as set out in the bill of particulars, when they said in
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excess of seventy miles per hour. However, with Dr. Wood's
testimony based upon assumptions, speculations and false
measurements, it set the stage for the jury to carry on in the
same manner. No amount of instruction could have warded
it away. We are in a small town; feelings are high; two people
lost their lives; someone should pay and an excuse is all that
is needed. It takes four days to try the case but only forty
minutes to walk out and come back with a verdict. Consequently, I say that the court saw the situation and he should
have taken it away from the jury and directed a verdict of
not guilty.

POINT III
THAT THE 1RIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE, IN ITS ENTIRETY, DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 FOR THE REASON THAT SAID INSTRUCTION IS A TRUE STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND THE
JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
UPON IT.
Instruction No. 10 was requested for the reason that at
the present time many jurors do not understand the difference
between negligence and the reckless disregard for the safety
of others, which means wilful or wanton misconduct. It was
prejudicial error to fail to give this instruction as requested.
It would have then made it possible for counsel to point out
clearly to the jury the difference in this criminal proceeding.
When the court refused to give it, it prejudiced the rights
of the defendant. See Schulz v. Fible, 48 NE 2d 899.
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CONCLUSION
We believe sincerely that the defendant was not charged
properly under the information as modified by the bill of particulars. That the testimony of the officers was conflicting as
well as their measurements. That the testimony of Dr. Woods
was based upon a false premise and caused great speculation.
That the case should have been taken from the jury and the
defendant found not guilty. That the defendant was denied
a substantial right when the court refused to give the jury
defendant's instruction No. 10.
Respectfully submitted,

VI ALTER G. MANN of
MANN AND HADFIELD
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
~--.:-
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